Aggressive or Imperceptible, or Both: Network Pruning Assisted Hybrid Byzantines in Federated Learning
About
In federated learning (FL), profiling and verifying each client is inherently difficult, which introduces a significant security vulnerability: malicious clients, commonly referred to as Byzantines, can degrade the accuracy of the global model by submitting poisoned updates during training. To mitigate this, the aggregation process at the parameter server must be robust against such adversarial behaviour. Most existing defences approach the Byzantine problem from an outlier detection perspective, treating malicious updates as statistical anomalies and ignoring the internal structure of the trained neural network (NN). Motivated by this, this work highlights the potential of leveraging side information tied to the NN architecture to design stronger, more targeted attacks. In particular, inspired by insights from sparse NNs, we introduce a hybrid sparse Byzantine attack. The attack consists of two coordinated components: (i) A sparse attack component that selectively manipulates parameters with higher sensitivity in the NN, aiming to cause maximum disruption with minimal visibility; (ii) A slow-accumulating attack component that silently poisons parameters over multiple rounds to evade detection. Together, these components create a strong but imperceptible attack strategy that can bypass common defences. We evaluate the proposed attack through extensive simulations and demonstrate its effectiveness against eight state-of-the-art defence mechanisms.