Revenue Maximization on Yao multi-bidder 2-item auctions b=4, a=3, p=0.3 2017 (discrete types)
8RevenueRegretNet
Evaluation results
| Method | Links | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| RegretNetNumber of Bidders (n)=82026.06 | 8 | 0.0363 | |
| Optimal (Analytical)Number of Bidders (n)=82026.06 | 7.9996 | — | |
| Ours (Certified Bound)Number of Bidders (n)=82026.06 | 7.9996 | — | |
| GemNetNumber of Bidders (n)=82026.06 | 7.9996 | — | |
| RegretNetNumber of Bidders (n)=52026.06 | 7.998 | 0.0396 | |
| Optimal (Analytical)Number of Bidders (n)=52026.06 | 7.984 | — | |
| Ours (Certified Bound)Number of Bidders (n)=52026.06 | 7.984 | — | |
| GemNetNumber of Bidders (n)=52026.06 | 7.983 | — | |
| RegretNetNumber of Bidders (n)=32026.06 | 7.837 | 0.0383 | |
| Optimal (Analytical)Number of Bidders (n)=32026.06 | 7.8309 | — | |
| Ours (Certified Bound)Number of Bidders (n)=32026.06 | 7.8309 | — | |
| GemNetNumber of Bidders (n)=32026.06 | 7.8309 | — |