What the Eyes See, the LLMs Miss: Exploiting Human Perception for Adversarial Text Attacks
About
Large language model (LLM)-powered content moderation systems are a critical defense against harmful online content. However, they operate primarily on tokenized text and often overlook visual cues that humans naturally use when interpreting content. We show that this limitation creates a fundamental vulnerability: content readily recognized as harmful by humans can evade automated moderation. To systematically study this problem, we introduce Human-Perceptible Adversarial Attacks (HPAA), which embed harmful expressions into otherwise benign text using visually salient typographic manipulations. HPAA strategically combines features such as spacing, emphasis, and spatial arrangement to preserve human recognition while reducing machine detectability. Operating in a black-box setting with a small query budget, the attack automatically generates evasive content without model access or gradient information. We evaluate HPAA on multiple datasets and thirteen widely deployed moderation systems, including commercial APIs and state-of-the-art open-source guardrails. With only three detector queries, generated attacks achieve over 86\% human recognition while keeping detection rates below 1\% across evaluated systems. We further identify the typographic factors driving successful evasion, analyze why current moderation architectures fail to capture these signals, and discuss practical defenses. Our findings reveal a fundamental blind spot in current LLM-based moderation systems and motivate moderation approaches that better align with human perceptual understanding.