AgentRedBench: Dynamic Redteaming and Integration-Aware Defense for LLM Agents over SaaS Integrations
About
Indirect prompt injection in tool-use agents is a concrete production threat: LLM agents read from integrations (third-party services such as Gmail, Salesforce, or Jira accessed through tool calls) whose response content the user neither writes nor controls. Existing benchmarks under-measure the threat: most cover only a handful of integrations with the same attack payload replayed across runs, and open-source guards are trained on chat-style data rather than tool-response content. We introduce AGENTREDBENCH, a dynamic LLM-driven redteaming benchmark of 215 subtle underspecified-authorization scenarios across 24 enterprise integrations and five attack types. Across an eight-model panel (Anthropic, OpenAI, Google), no-guard attack success rate ranges from 32% to 81%. To keep the scenario set out of training corpora and preserve headline ASR meaning over time, we release the codebase, integration schemas, and AGENTREDGUARD model openly; the canonical scenarios are evaluated through a maintainer-mediated channel with immutable versioning. AGENTREDGUARD cuts online attack success by 75-77pp across three target model families (Haiku, GPT-5.4-mini, Gemini-3-flash) at 0.0% real-benign false-positive rate (0.2% on a synthetic-benign corpus), outperforming every open-source baseline with non-trivial detection (Llama Guard, PromptGuard 2, ProtectAI) on both axes. Cross-integration and cross-attacker holdouts (two independent attacker families held out from training) confirm the gain transfers beyond the training subset.