Adversarial SQL Injection Generation with LLM-Based Architectures
About
SQL injection (SQLi) attacks are still one of the serious attacks ranked in the Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 threats. Today, with advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI), especially in Large Language Models (LLMs), an opportunity has been created for automating adversarial attack tests to measure the defense mechanisms. In this paper, we aim to create a comprehensive evaluation of use cases that utilize LLMs for adversarial SQL injection generation. We introduce two novel LLM-based systems, Retrieval Augmented Generation for Adversarial SQLi (RADAGAS) and Reflective Chain-of-Thought SQLi (RefleXQLi), and compare them with existing baselines against 10 Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) and one execution-based MySQL validator. To perform a comprehensive test, we used six rule-based open-source WAFs (ModSecurity PL1--3, Coraza PL1--3), 2 AI/ML-based WAFs (WAF Brain, CNN-WAF), and 2 commercial WAFs (AWS WAF and Cloudflare WAF). For the LLM models, we used GPT-4o, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, and DeepSeek R1. Our tests consist of 240 experiments that generate 240,000 payloads and perform 2.2 million tests against WAFs. Our comprehensive evaluation reveals that RADAGAS-GPT4o outperforms other baseline models with a 22.73\% bypass rate. The proposed RADAGAS variants are highly successful on AI/ML-based WAFs (92.49\% on WAF-Brain by RADAGAS-DeepSeek, 80.48\% on CNN-WAF by RADAGAS-Claude), but struggle to bypass rule-based WAFs (0--5.70\% on ModSecurity and Coraza). In addition to these findings, another observation is that creating less diverse payloads achieves more bypasses, however they show poor results if the initially chosen payload is not successful. We observe that our findings provide a comprehensive view on using LLM-based approaches in security testing.