Revisiting Regularized Policy Optimization for Stable and Efficient Reinforcement Learning in Two-Player Games
About
Two-player games such as board games have long been used as traditional benchmarks for reinforcement learning. This work revisits a policy optimization method with reverse Kullback-Leibler regularization and entropy regularization and analyzes this combination in two-player zero-sum settings from theoretical and empirical perspectives. From a theoretical perspective, we investigate the stability of the policy update rule in two theoretical settings: game-theoretic normal-form games and finite-length games. We provide novel convergence guarantees and verify our theoretical results through numerical experiments on synthetic games. From an empirical perspective, we derive a practical model-free reinforcement learning algorithm based on the regularized policy optimization. We validate the training efficiency of our algorithm through comprehensive experiments on five board games: Animal Shogi, Gardner Chess, Go, Hex, and Othello. Experimental results show that our agent learns more efficiently than existing methods across environments.