Learning Incentive Structures for Cooperative Resilience in Multi-Agent Systems under Social Dilemmas
About
Multi-agent social dilemmas, such as the tragedy of the commons, capture settings where individual incentives conflict with collective well-being, making these systems highly vulnerable to collapse under disruptions. In this context, this work studies cooperative resilience, understood as the system-level ability to maintain collective well-being under perturbations through adaptive agent behavior. We propose a framework for learning incentive structures aligned with collective well-being in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems, where reward functions shape individual decision-making and collective behavior. A resilience metric is used to score and rank agent trajectories, allowing the inference of reward functions that promote resilient collective behavior. These inferred reward functions are integrated into the multi-agent reinforcement learning process to shape agent interactions in social dilemma settings. The approach is evaluated in resource-sharing environments subject to disruptions, using three incentive structures: individual incentives, resilience-aligned incentives, and a hybrid incentive structure that combines both individual and collective components. The results show that the hybrid incentive structure promotes sustained collective behavior, reduces collapse events associated with resource depletion, and preserves system performance under disruption. These findings highlight the role of incentive design as a mechanism for promoting resilient collective behavior and provide a computational framework for multi-agent social dilemmas under disruptions.