Metaphor-based Jailbreak Attacks on Text-to-Image Models
About
Text-to-image (T2I) models commonly incorporate defense mechanisms to prevent the generation of sensitive images. Unfortunately, recent jailbreak attacks have shown that adversarial prompts can effectively bypass these mechanisms and induce T2I models to produce sensitive content, revealing critical safety vulnerabilities. However, existing attack methods implicitly assume that the attacker knows the type of deployed defenses, which limits their effectiveness against unknown or diverse defense mechanisms. In this work, we reveal an underexplored vulnerability of T2I models to metaphor-based jailbreak attacks (MJA), which aims to attack diverse defense mechanisms without prior knowledge of their type by generating metaphor-based adversarial prompts. Specifically, MJA consists of two modules: an LLM-based multi-agent generation module (LMAG) and an adversarial prompt optimization module (APO). LMAG decomposes the generation of metaphor-based adversarial prompts into three subtasks: metaphor retrieval, context matching, and adversarial prompt generation. Subsequently, LMAG coordinates three LLM-based agents to generate diverse adversarial prompts by exploring various metaphors and contexts. To enhance attack efficiency, APO first trains a surrogate model to predict the attack results of adversarial prompts and then designs an acquisition strategy to adaptively identify optimal adversarial prompts. Extensive experiments on T2I models with various external and internal defense mechanisms demonstrate that MJA achieves stronger attack performance while using fewer queries, compared with six baseline methods. Additionally, we provide an in-depth vulnerability analysis suggesting that metaphor-based adversarial prompts evade safety mechanisms by inducing semantic ambiguity, while sensitive images arise from the model's probabilistic interpretation of concealed semantics.