Participatory Budgeting: Data, Tools, and Analysis

About

We provide a library of participatory budgeting data (Pabulib) and open source tools (Pabutools and Pabustats) for analysing this data. We analyse how the results of participatory budgeting elections would change if a different selection rule was applied. We provide evidence that the outcomes of the Method of Equal Shares would be considerably fairer than those of the Utilitarian Greedy rule that is currently in use. We also show that the division of the projects into districts and/or categories can in many cases be avoided when using proportional rules. We find that this would increase the overall utility of the voters.

Piotr Faliszewski, Jaros\law Flis, Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Piotr Skowron, Dariusz Stolicki, Stanis\law Szufa, Nimrod Talmon · 2023

Related benchmarks

Task	Dataset	Result
Participatory Budgeting Rule Evaluation	Synthetic (test)	Omega'[sat^cost]0.895	30
Participatory Budgeting Rule Evaluation	Pabulib small (test)	omega'[sat^cost]0.78	30
Participatory Budgeting Rule Evaluation	Pabulib large (test)	Omega Prime (sat^cost)0.797	30
Participatory Budgeting	Pabulib approval ballots v1 (ID)	W'[sat_cost]0.78	15
Participatory Budgeting	Pabulib approval ballots v1 (OOD)	w'[sat_cost]0.797	15
Participatory Budgeting	Synthetic Euclidean model (test)	Omega'[sat^card]0.977	15
Participatory Budgeting	Pabulib OOD (test)	W'[sat_card]0.985	15
Participatory Budgeting	Pabulib small (test)	Omega'[sat^card]0.967	15
Participatory Budgeting	Pabulib large (test)	omega'[sat^card]0.985	15
Participatory Budgeting	Pabulib ID (test)	W'[sat_card]96.7	15