Mitigating Membership Inference Attacks by Self-Distillation Through a Novel Ensemble Architecture
About
Membership inference attacks are a key measure to evaluate privacy leakage in machine learning (ML) models. These attacks aim to distinguish training members from non-members by exploiting differential behavior of the models on member and non-member inputs. The goal of this work is to train ML models that have high membership privacy while largely preserving their utility; we therefore aim for an empirical membership privacy guarantee as opposed to the provable privacy guarantees provided by techniques like differential privacy, as such techniques are shown to deteriorate model utility. Specifically, we propose a new framework to train privacy-preserving models that induces similar behavior on member and non-member inputs to mitigate membership inference attacks. Our framework, called SELENA, has two major components. The first component and the core of our defense is a novel ensemble architecture for training. This architecture, which we call Split-AI, splits the training data into random subsets, and trains a model on each subset of the data. We use an adaptive inference strategy at test time: our ensemble architecture aggregates the outputs of only those models that did not contain the input sample in their training data. We prove that our Split-AI architecture defends against a large family of membership inference attacks, however, it is susceptible to new adaptive attacks. Therefore, we use a second component in our framework called Self-Distillation to protect against such stronger attacks. The Self-Distillation component (self-)distills the training dataset through our Split-AI ensemble, without using any external public datasets. Through extensive experiments on major benchmark datasets we show that SELENA presents a superior trade-off between membership privacy and utility compared to the state of the art.