Nash Equilibrium Efficiency Analysis on Resource Allocation Game
3Best NE EfficiencyKelly
Evaluation Results
| Method | Links | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| KellyBidding Space=θi in R>=0, Allocation=xi = θi / sum_j θj, Pricing=pi = θi, Unit Price=uniform2026.06 | 3 | 3 | |
| VCGBidding Space=vi : [0, 1] -> R, Allocation=arg maxx sum_i vi(xi), Pricing=externality payment, Unit Price=non-uniform2026.06 | 1 | 0 | |
| Scalar VCGBidding Space=θi in R>=0, Allocation=arg maxx sum_i θi xi^α, Pricing=externality payment, Unit Price=non-uniform2026.06 | 1 | 0 | |
| alpha-Prop.Bidding Space=θi in R>=0, Allocation=xi = θi^(1/α) / sum_j θj^(1/α), Pricing=pi = θi^(1/α) / (sum_j θj^(1/α))^(1-α), Unit Price=uniform2026.06 | 1 | 1 | |
| ESPABidding Space=θi in R>=0, Allocation=xi = θi / sum_j θj, Pricing=(sum_{j!=i} θj) * integral_0^θi g(t + sum_{j!=i} θj) / (t + sum_{j!=i} θj)^2 dt, Unit Price=non-uniform2026.06 | 1 | 1 |