Agent-Assisted Side-Channel Attacks on Non-Prefix KV Cache in RAG
About
Modern Large Language Model (LLM) serving engines increasingly rely on Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) and non-prefix Key-Value (KV) cache fusion to accelerate long-context, multi-tenant inference. While existing KV cache side-channel attacks require strict linear prefix alignment--rendering them ineffective against real-world RAG queries that contain unique, user-specific private prefixes--we uncover a critical class of structural vulnerabilities inherent to chunk-aware memory scheduling. We demonstrate that the deterministic micro-architectural mechanisms used to align and fuse disjoint memory chunks inadvertently leak a continuous "Step-Wave" timing signature. Exploiting this physical observation, we introduce SpliceLeak, the first end-to-end side-channel attack targeting non-prefix KV cache fusion. SpliceLeak executes a systematic two-phase privacy breach: it first structurally fingerprints the exact length of hidden private prompts, and subsequently manipulates boundary collisions to extract exact semantic content token-by-token. Extensive evaluations on production-grade frameworks (vLLM integrated with LMCache) demonstrate that SpliceLeak achieves up to a 100% extraction success rate in bounded-entropy scenarios. Driven by a deterministic +104 ms hardware latency void, the attack requires as few as 63 requests per token, piercing through realistic continuous batching noise. To resolve the inherent conflict between memory deduplication and security, we propose SpliceDefense, a bipartite mitigation framework consisting of Quantized Chunk Padding (QCP) and Constant-Time Boundary Fusion (CTBF). Our evaluations confirm that SpliceDefense effectively flattens the side-channel signal (Delta TTFT ~ 0) with negligible throughput overhead, preserving the critical benefits of global cache sharing.