The Self-Correction Illusion: LLMs Correct Others but Not Themselves
About
Recent work shows that LLM agents struggle to correct errors in their own reasoning traces yet show markedly higher correction rates when identical claims appear under external sources. We ask whether this asymmetry reflects a capability deficit or a role-label artifact: does an agent's willingness to correct a wrong claim depend causally on the chat-template role that carries it, rather than on the claim's content? Our setup keeps the erroneous claim byte-identical across all conditions (SHA-256 verified) and varies only its wrapping role: the agent's own \role{<thought>}, a \role{user} message, a \role{tool} response, or a \role{system <memory>} block. Across 13 model-domain cells covering seven model families and three domains ($n{=}30$ paired tasks per cell), relabeling the claim from \role{<thought>} to an external role lifts the explicit-correction rate by 23 to 93 percentage points, with 10 of 13 cells reaching $p{<}0.001$. Further experiments confirm that the effect is asymmetric, mechanistically decomposable, and robust across domains. The failure to self-correct is not a cognitive deficit; it is a chat-template artifact. We exploit this artifact by designing a prompt-structure-only intervention that requires no training and no model modification, with its strongest role label being domain-dependent: \role{<memory>} dominates on math, while a plain \role{user} message dominates on logical deduction.