# Merkle Tree Certificate Post-Quantum PKI for Kubernetes and Cloud-Native 5G/B5G Core

Source: [Merkle Tree Certificate Post-Quantum PKI for Kubernetes and Cloud-Native 5G/B5G Core](<https://www.sota2.com/research/paper/69d48fda7d0172140ec746b7>)

Collection index: [llms.txt](<https://www.sota2.com/research/llms.txt>)

Data updated: 2026-04-08T05:00:12.103Z

Authors: Lakshya Chopra, Vipin Kumar Rathi

Published: 2026-04-05T17:17:07.000Z

## Abstract

Post-quantum signature schemes such as ML-DSA-65 produce signatures of 3,309 bytes and public keys of 1,952 bytes over 50 times larger than classical Ed25519. In TLS-authenticated environments like Kubernetes control planes and 5G Core networks, where every inter-component connection is mutually authenticated, this overhead compounds across thousands of handshakes per second. Merkle Tree Certificates (MTC), currently under development at IETF, replace per-certificate issuer signatures with Merkle inclusion proofs and, in the landmark mode, eliminate on-wire signatures from certificate authentication entirely. We present MTC-based PKI architectures for Kubernetes and 3GPP 5G Service-Based Architecture. Starting from the infrastructure layer, we replace the Kubernetes cluster CA with an MTCA deployment that issues MTC certificates to control plane components, with cosigners and a DaemonSet-based landmark distributor. Building on this, we design a certificate lifecycle for 5G Network Functions deployed against QORE, a post-quantum 5G Core. We implement MTC proof construction and verification in Go crypto/tls and crypto/x509 packages. Our measurements on an Intel i9-12900 show MTC landmark verification completing in under 2 {\\mu}s compared to 24 microseconds for ECDSA signature verification-with no measurable impact on TLS handshake time. We further propose a 6G-native architecture where the NRF serves as the MTCA and the SCP as witness cosigner, and discuss applicability to Non-Terrestrial Networks.

## Recorded benchmark results

A research result applies to its stated dataset, split, metric and evaluation configuration. Compare like-for-like settings, preserve the metric's unit and direction, and distinguish paper-reported results from independent reproduction. The best result recorded here is not a claim of exhaustive, current global coverage.

- [Security Protocol Performance Evaluation on TLS 1.3 Handshake (loopback)](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/security-protocol-performance-evaluation-on-tls-1-3-handshake-loopback.md>): Security Protocol Performance Evaluation; TLS 1.3 Handshake (loopback); Certificate Size (B): 425.

- [Communication Overhead Analysis on TLS Handshake Communication](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/communication-overhead-analysis-on-tls-handshake-communication.md>): Communication Overhead Analysis; TLS Handshake Communication; Total On-Wire Bytes (B): 1020.

- [Handshake Overhead Measurement on TLS Handshake Certificates](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/handshake-overhead-measurement-on-tls-handshake-certificates.md>): Handshake Overhead Measurement; TLS Handshake Certificates; Auth Overhead (B): 530.

## Original sources and implementation

[Original paper](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.04191>)

[PDF](<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2604.04191.pdf>)
