# Disguising Topology and Side-Channel Information through Covert Gate- and ML-Enabled IP Camouflaging

Source: [Disguising Topology and Side-Channel Information through Covert Gate- and ML-Enabled IP Camouflaging](<https://www.sota2.com/research/paper/69ca039b0636e5bf4afc9404>)

Collection index: [llms.txt](<https://www.sota2.com/research/llms.txt>)

Data updated: 2026-03-31T05:00:04.048Z

Authors: Junling Fan, David Koblah, Domenic Forte

Published: 2026-03-26T20:53:10.000Z

## Abstract

Semiconductor intellectual property (IP) theft incurs hundreds of billions in annual losses, driven by advanced reverse engineering (RE) techniques. Traditional \`\`cryptic'' IC camouflaging methods typically focus on hiding localized gate functionality but remain vulnerable to system-level structural analysis. This paper explores \`\`mimetic deception,'' where a functional IP (F) is designed to structurally and visually masquerade as a completely different appearance IP (A). We provide a comprehensive evaluation of three deceptive methodologies: IP Camouflage, Graph Matching, and DNAS-NAND Gate Array, analyzing their resilience against GNN-based node classification, and Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Crucially, we demonstrate that mimetic deception achieves a novel anti-side-channel defense: by forcing the mis-classification of cryptographic primitives, the adversary is led to apply an incorrect power model, causing the DPA attack to fail. Our results validate that this multi-layered approach effectively thwarts the entire RE toolchain by poisoning the structural and logical data used for netlist understanding.

## Recorded benchmark results

A research result applies to its stated dataset, split, metric and evaluation configuration. Compare like-for-like settings, preserve the metric's unit and direction, and distinguish paper-reported results from independent reproduction. The best result recorded here is not a claim of exhaustive, current global coverage.

- [Functional Circuit Deception on PRESENT to DES S-Box Avg variants (S1-S8 mean)](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/functional-circuit-deception-on-present-to-des-s-box-avg-variants-s1-s8-mean.md>): Functional Circuit Deception; PRESENT to DES S-Box Avg variants (S1-S8 mean); GNNRE Score: 9.4.

- [Functional Circuit Deception on PRESENT to AES S-Box Standard](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/functional-circuit-deception-on-present-to-aes-s-box-standard.md>): Functional Circuit Deception; PRESENT to AES S-Box Standard; GNNRE Score: 18.

- [Functional Circuit Deception on DES to AES S-Box Avg variants (S1-S8 mean)](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/functional-circuit-deception-on-des-to-aes-s-box-avg-variants-s1-s8-mean.md>): Functional Circuit Deception; DES to AES S-Box Avg variants (S1-S8 mean); DPA Score: 45.

## Original sources and implementation

[Original paper](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.25904>)

[PDF](<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.25904.pdf>)
