# TALUS: FIPS-204-Exact Threshold ML-DSA via Boundary Clearance

Source: [TALUS: FIPS-204-Exact Threshold ML-DSA via Boundary Clearance](<https://www.sota2.com/research/paper/69c21ad40636e5bf4afc4d25>)

Collection index: [llms.txt](<https://www.sota2.com/research/llms.txt>)

Data updated: 2026-08-12T05:00:13.408Z

Authors: Leo Kao, Raymond Chang

Published: 2026-03-23T15:37:37.000Z

## Abstract

We present TALUS, a threshold signing protocol for ML-DSA (FIPS 204) that supports an arbitrary number of parties, emits signatures accepted by any unmodified ML-DSA verifier, and reduces, for a bounded number of signatures per key, to ML-DSA's own assumptions (Module-LWE and SelfTargetMSIS). Its core is the Boundary Clearance Condition (BCC): for a constant fraction of nonces (31.7% at ML-DSA-65), the secret vector s2 provably cannot cross a rounding boundary, so the s2-dependent rejection check can be enforced offline on preprocessed nonces. This removes the interaction that forces multi-round signing in prior schemes, yielding a TEE-assisted one-round profile and a fully distributed honest-majority MPC profile with two online rounds, both built on a Carry Elimination Framework that computes the shared commitment w1 = HighBits(Ay) on secret shares, a step we show is unavoidable. We prove a lower bound: any FIPS-204-exact threshold scheme revealing a summed (Irwin-Hall) nonce admits an efficient key-recovery attack after about 2^30 signatures under one key (at ML-DSA-65), so no q\_s-independent unforgeability is possible for this class. Complementing it, a q\_s-bounded analysis certifies over 105 bits at the operational signing cap for the external view, with insider ceilings disclosed per view and a mandatory key rotation capping each key's signing lifetime. A Rust implementation across all three FIPS 204 levels demonstrates practicality.

## Recorded benchmark results

A research result applies to its stated dataset, split, metric and evaluation configuration. Compare like-for-like settings, preserve the metric's unit and direction, and distinguish paper-reported results from independent reproduction. The best result recorded here is not a claim of exhaustive, current global coverage.

- [Threshold Digital Signature on ML-DSA-44 FIPS 204](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/threshold-digital-signature-on-ml-dsa-44-fips-204.md>): Threshold Digital Signature; ML-DSA-44 FIPS 204; Amortised Signing Latency (ms): 0.62.

- [Threshold Digital Signature on ML-DSA-65 FIPS 204](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/threshold-digital-signature-on-ml-dsa-65-fips-204.md>): Threshold Digital Signature; ML-DSA-65 FIPS 204; Amortised Signing Latency (ms): 1.52.

- [Threshold Digital Signature Signing on ML-DSA-44](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/threshold-digital-signature-signing-on-ml-dsa-44.md>): Threshold Digital Signature Signing; ML-DSA-44; Online Latency (ms): 0.16.

- [Threshold Digital Signature Signing on ML-DSA-65](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/threshold-digital-signature-signing-on-ml-dsa-65.md>): Threshold Digital Signature Signing; ML-DSA-65; Online Time (ms): 0.29.

- [Threshold Digital Signature Signing on ML-DSA-87](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/threshold-digital-signature-signing-on-ml-dsa-87.md>): Threshold Digital Signature Signing; ML-DSA-87; Online Latency (ms): 0.41.

- [Threshold Digital Signature on ML-DSA FIPS 204](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/threshold-digital-signature-on-ml-dsa-fips-204.md>): Threshold Digital Signature; ML-DSA FIPS 204; Rnd: not recorded.

## Original sources and implementation

[Original paper](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2603.22109>)

[PDF](<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.22109.pdf>)
