# AmphiKey: A Dual-Mode Secure Authenticated Key Encapsulation Protocol for Smart Grid

Source: [AmphiKey: A Dual-Mode Secure Authenticated Key Encapsulation Protocol for Smart Grid](<https://www.sota2.com/research/paper/68fa7b651e209131cea882f6>)

Collection index: [llms.txt](<https://www.sota2.com/research/llms.txt>)

Data updated: 2026-03-11T05:00:04.181Z

Authors: Kazi Hassan Shakib, Muhammad Asfand Hafeez, Arslan Munir

Published: 2025-09-01T18:21:51.000Z

## Abstract

AmphiKey, a dual-mode post-quantum/traditional (PQ/T) hybrid authenticated key exchange mechanism (AKEM) has been designed to secure smart grid communications against both classical and quantum threats. AmphiKey offers two distinct operational modes within a single framework: an Authenticated Mode and a Deniable Mode. The Authenticated Mode employs a blackbox approach, combining ephemeral ML-KEM-768 and X25519 with long-term Raccoon DSA keys to provide forward secrecy and strong, non-repudiable authenticity. This design achieves "OR" confidentiality, where security holds if either of the KEMs is unbroken, and robust "AND" authenticity. For the signature operation, it leverages the 'masking-friendly' Raccoon digital signature (DSA), which is specifically designed for side-channel attack resistance, though this protection is localized to the signing key and does not provide deniability. In contrast, Deniable Mode provides deniable authentication, preserving privacy. The protocol used ML-KEM-768 (AKEM-1), Ephemeral X25519 (AKEM-2), Raccoon-based DSA (Rac) (compared performance to ML-DSA-65), and the Ascon cipher to deliver its security guarantees. Key contributions include providing a flexible protocol with enhanced security, optional deniability, and efficiency adapted to the diverse needs of the smart grid infrastructure. We present a comprehensive performance evaluation on a heterogeneous testbed featuring a powerful server and client (AMD Ryzen 5) and a resource-constrained client (Raspberry Pi). In efficient Deniable mode, the full handshake completes in 0.15 ms on the server and 0.41 ms on the Raspberry Pi client. In contrast, the Authenticated Mode is bottlenecked by the client-side signature generation; the handshake takes 4.8 ms for the Raspberry Pi client to initiate and 0.84 ms for the server to verify.

## Recorded benchmark results

A research result applies to its stated dataset, split, metric and evaluation configuration. Compare like-for-like settings, preserve the metric's unit and direction, and distinguish paper-reported results from independent reproduction. The best result recorded here is not a claim of exhaustive, current global coverage.

- [Authenticated Key Exchange on Raspberry Pi](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/authenticated-key-exchange-on-raspberry-pi.md>): Authenticated Key Exchange; Raspberry Pi; Payload Size (Bytes): 1152.

- [Security Property and Performance Analysis on State-of-the-Art Security Characteristics](<https://www.sota2.com/research/sota/security-property-and-performance-analysis-on-state-of-the-art-security-characteristics.md>): Security Property and Performance Analysis; State-of-the-Art Comparison: Security Properties and Performance Characteristics; Payload Size (Bytes): 1152.

## Original sources and implementation

[Original paper](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2509.01701>)

[PDF](<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2509.01701.pdf>)
