# The Silent Saboteur: Imperceptible Adversarial Attacks against Black-Box Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems

Source: [The Silent Saboteur: Imperceptible Adversarial Attacks against Black-Box Retrieval-Augmented Generation Systems](<https://www.sota2.com/research/paper/68fa78d51e209131cea7aa76>)

Collection index: [llms.txt](<https://www.sota2.com/research/llms.txt>)

Data updated: 2025-12-22T11:41:52.851Z

Authors: Hongru Song, Yu-an Liu, Ruqing Zhang, Jiafeng Guo, Jianming Lv, Maarten de Rijke, Xueqi Cheng

Published: 2025-05-24T08:19:25.000Z

## Abstract

We explore adversarial attacks against retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems to identify their vulnerabilities. We focus on generating human-imperceptible adversarial examples and introduce a novel imperceptible retrieve-to-generate attack against RAG. This task aims to find imperceptible perturbations that retrieve a target document, originally excluded from the initial top-$k$ candidate set, in order to influence the final answer generation. To address this task, we propose ReGENT, a reinforcement learning-based framework that tracks interactions between the attacker and the target RAG and continuously refines attack strategies based on relevance-generation-naturalness rewards. Experiments on newly constructed factual and non-factual question-answering benchmarks demonstrate that ReGENT significantly outperforms existing attack methods in misleading RAG systems with small imperceptible text perturbations.

## Recorded benchmark results

A research result applies to its stated dataset, split, metric and evaluation configuration. Compare like-for-like settings, preserve the metric's unit and direction, and distinguish paper-reported results from independent reproduction. The best result recorded here is not a claim of exhaustive, current global coverage.

## Original sources and implementation

[Original paper](<https://arxiv.org/abs/2505.18583>)

[PDF](<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2505.18583.pdf>)
