# Testing Robustness Against Unforeseen Adversaries

Source: [Testing Robustness Against Unforeseen Adversaries](<https://www.sota2.com/research/paper/68fa710b1e209131cea4edc7>)

Collection index: [llms.txt](<https://www.sota2.com/research/llms.txt>)

Data updated: 2025-10-27T06:27:18.233Z

Authors: Max Kaufmann, Daniel Kang, Yi Sun, Steven Basart, Xuwang Yin, Mantas Mazeika, Akul Arora, Adam Dziedzic, Franziska Boenisch, Tom Brown, Jacob Steinhardt, Dan Hendrycks

Published: 2019-08-21T17:36:48.000Z

## Abstract

Adversarial robustness research primarily focuses on L\_p perturbations, and most defenses are developed with identical training-time and test-time adversaries. However, in real-world applications developers are unlikely to have access to the full range of attacks or corruptions their system will face. Furthermore, worst-case inputs are likely to be diverse and need not be constrained to the L\_p ball. To narrow in on this discrepancy between research and reality we introduce ImageNet-UA, a framework for evaluating model robustness against a range of unforeseen adversaries, including eighteen new non-L\_p attacks. To perform well on ImageNet-UA, defenses must overcome a generalization gap and be robust to a diverse attacks not encountered during training. In extensive experiments, we find that existing robustness measures do not capture unforeseen robustness, that standard robustness techniques are beat by alternative training strategies, and that novel methods can improve unforeseen robustness. We present ImageNet-UA as a useful tool for the community for improving the worst-case behavior of machine learning systems.

## Recorded benchmark results

A research result applies to its stated dataset, split, metric and evaluation configuration. Compare like-for-like settings, preserve the metric's unit and direction, and distinguish paper-reported results from independent reproduction. The best result recorded here is not a claim of exhaustive, current global coverage.

## Original sources and implementation

[Original paper](<https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.08016>)

[PDF](<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1908.08016.pdf>)
