# Envy-Freeness in House Allocation Problems Source: [Envy-Freeness in House Allocation Problems]() Collection index: [llms.txt]() Data updated: 2025-10-25T21:45:30.461Z Authors: Jiarui Gan, Warut Suksompong, Alexandros A. Voudouris Published: 2019-05-01T19:45:40.000Z ## Abstract We consider the house allocation problem, where $m$ houses are to be assigned to $n$ agents so that each agent gets exactly one house. We present a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether an envy-free assignment exists, and if so, computes one such assignment. We also show that an envy-free assignment exists with high probability if the number of houses exceeds the number of agents by a logarithmic factor. ## Recorded benchmark results A research result applies to its stated dataset, split, metric and evaluation configuration. Compare like-for-like settings, preserve the metric's unit and direction, and distinguish paper-reported results from independent reproduction. The best result recorded here is not a claim of exhaustive, current global coverage. - [Envy-Free House Allocation on House Allocation 0/1 preferences](): Envy-Free House Allocation; House Allocation 0/1 preferences; Sum Score: 20. - [Envy-Free House Allocation on House Allocation Identical preferences](): Envy-Free House Allocation; House Allocation Identical preferences; Sum: 20. - [Envy-Free House Allocation on House Allocation Additive Monotonic preferences](): Envy-Free House Allocation; House Allocation Additive Monotonic preferences; Sum Utility: 20. ## Original sources and implementation [Original paper]() [PDF]()